search3 Szh .searchT FrizQuadrata e 051873 i 051873 p Blackmailedslave e Szh et Blackmailedslave n FrizQuadrata FrizQuadrata eua Blackmailedslave i FrizQuadrata n searchrvsearchd 051873 tsearcha Szh searchq 051873 o Szh ; Blackmailedslave esearchon 051873 a Szh y& Blackmailedslave u Blackmailedslave t FrizQuadrata r FrizQuadrata dcrsearch, Szh (. 051873 . Blackmailedslave search agaz Blackmailedslave n Szh d Szh tsearchr Szh a Blackmailedslave d FrizQuadrata p Szh b FrizQuadrata i Blackmailedslave h Szh r FrizQuadrata www.dsx123.uqc.cna Blackmailedslave 051873 ich Szh rg FrizQuadrata searchh Szh sdusearchysearchbsearch Szh cc1335940342573_Rpinsearch Szh o FrizQuadrata isearchs 1336684912579_Rfsearchasearch&q 051873 o;www.288pp.comri Blackmailedslave arsearch& Blackmailedslave usearcht; Szh p1od FrizQuadrata c 051873 r Blackmailedslave s e Blackmailedslave o 051873 d.search2 Szh 0.F 051873 Rsearch search 5search2 Szh 1)searchbsearch Szh 199search)search FrizQuadrata he r FrizQuadrata glasearchiosearchs Szh desearchi FrizQuadrata ep FrizQuadrata iay FrizQuadrata pro FrizQuadrata u Szh e FrizQuadrata s FrizQuadrata as searchqot1336724174096_Ran Szh pe1336538268046_Rson who actually films, videotapes, or photographs a visual depiction of actual sexually explicit conduct." 28 C.F.R. § 75.1(c)(2) (1995). Back to text at note 137.

138. The requirement of a photo ID appears only in the Attorney General's implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 75.2(a)(1) (1995), issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2257(g) (1995). Back to text at note 138.

139. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b)(1) (1995). Back to text at note 139.

140. American Library Assoc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 1215, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Tatel, J., dissenting from denial of suggestion for rehearing in banc). Back to text at note 140.

141. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(h)(3) (1995). Back to text at note 141.

142. Id. Back to text at note 142.

143. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b)(2)-(3) (1995). Back to text at note 143.

144. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(i) (1995). Cf. White Paper on Copyright, supra note 126, at 235-36 (relating to regulation of "copyright management information"). Back to text at note 144.

145. "This requirement is satisfied if the producer asks the performer for the information." H.R. Doc. No. 100-129, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1987) (President's message transmitting 1988 act to Congress); 33 F.3d at 92 (relying on this limiting construction). Presumably, however, a performer who showed obviously phony ID that was accepted as genuine by a producer who knew it was false would face some risk of a conspiracy charge. Back to text at note 145.

146. See American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412, 419 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Back to text at note 146.

147. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 94. Given that there have been suggestions that some actors are forced to perform at gunpoint, it seems fair to wonder if Judge Buckley's assertion is as self-evident as he thought it was. See, e.g., Linda Lovelace & Michael McGrady, Ordeal (1980); see also Laura Lederer, Then and Now: An Interview with a Former Pornography Model, in Take Back the Night: Women on Pornography 57 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980) (describing rape and other threats from producers); Robin L. West, The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography Report, 1987 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 681, 686-88 (summarizing testimony to Meese Commission on Pornography challenging assertion that pornography is "consensually produced by voluntary participants in a voluntary market").

Performers acting for hire who fear their employers may be able to work under a pseudonym; nothing in the social security regulations, for example, appears to prohibit this. Cf. 60 Fed. Reg. 42,431 (1995) (amending 20 C.F.R. § 422.120 to state that agency will attempt to contact worker before contacting employer in cases where employees name in wage report differs from name in Social Security records, but that IRS will assess penalty only if social security number is absent or invalid). In such cases the requirement that they give their real name may add to their risks. The effect on a hypothetical unpaid performer engaged in social commentary is, perhaps, even greater. Back to text at note 147.

148. 28 C.F.R. § 75.2(b) (1995). Back to text at note 148.

149. This result as applied to obviously adult performers is particularly anomalous given that the purpose of the Act is to combat child pornography. See American Library Ass'n, 794 F. Supp. at 417-18 (noting anomaly). The D.C. Circuit alluded to this issue in a discussion of the problems the Act creates for "appropriationist artists," that is, "photographers who create distinct works that incorporate photographs taken by others--typically without permission." American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 93. Although the court suggested that "application of the Act to [appropriationist artists] would raise a serious First Amendment problem because of the difficulty they may encounter in securing the information" that the Act requires them to keep on file, it concluded that the record was inadequate to present the issue in "clean-cut and concrete form." Id. In contrast, the D.C. Circuit gave short shrift to the District Court's suggestion that the Act "will effectively ban foreign produced images of sexually explicit conduct," even when the performers are adults. 794 F. Supp. at 418. "Foreign producers who wish to peddle their products in the United States should be expected to abide by our laws," the court stated, warning that to rule otherwise would create "a loophole" for domestic child pornographers to send their wares abroad for re-export to the United States. 33 F.3d at 93. By defining the problem as one of "foreign producers trying to peddle their products" rather than one of domestic parties seeking to purchase and re-use, re-package or re-distribute products that can plausibly be defined as speech, the court evaded a constitutional problem posed by the Act. Back to text at note 149.

150. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(c) (1995); 28 C.F.R. § 75.5 (1995). Back to text at note 150.

151. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(f)(4) (1995) (making it an offence "knowingly to sell or otherwise transfer, or offer for sale or transfer" any "book, magazine, periodical, film, video, or other matter, produce[d] in whole or in part with materials which have been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or which is intended for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce" but lacking the affixed information about the location of the records). Back to text at note 151.

152. A person selling or giving covered materials has a duty to ensure that the statement has been affixed to the materials, but no duty to determine the accuracy of the contents of the statement or the records required to be kept. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(f)(4) (1995). Back to text at note 152.

153. American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 81, 84-85. The District Court had found the Act unconstitutional, see American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412, 418 (D.D.C. 1992). Back to text at note 153.

154. 33 F.3d at 85 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986)). Back to text at note 154.

155. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Back to text at note 155.

156. Burson v. Freemen, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1850 (1992); Boos, 485 U.S. at 319; Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (regulation "may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech"); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1980). Back to text at note 156.

157. 33 F.3d at 85 (citing Renton and Boos). Back to text at note 157.

158. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-48. Back to text at note 158.

159. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards). Back to text at note 159.

160. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 84-85. Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (noting compelling governmental interest in eradicating evils associated with child pornography). Back to text at note 160.

161. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(d) (1993). Back to text at note 161.

162. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 94-95 (Reynolds, J., dissenting). In his later dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Tatel, who was not a member of the original panel, argued that,

The only class of producers whose behavior this statute is likely to influence--those who ignore the age of their models but would nonetheless refuse to employ individuals they knew were minors--could be equally deterred, with no corresponding regulatory burden on protected speech, by rewriting the child pornography statutes to impose criminal liability upon those who recklessly or negligently violate them. . . . While such an approach might allow a few individuals to escape liability by establishing that they had made a reasonable mistake about the age of the model, "even as compelling a societal interest as the protection of minors must occasionally yield to specific constitutional guarantees." United States v. U.S. District Court, 858 F.2d 534, 543 (9th Cir. 1988).

American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 47 F.3d 1215, 1216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Tatel, J., dissenting from denial of suggestion for rehearing en banc). Back to text at note 162.

163. See American Library Ass'n, 713 F. Supp. at 475. An earlier version of the record-keeping requirements of the Act was held to be unconstitutional in American Library Ass'n v. Thornburg, 713 F. Supp 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot sub nom. American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Back to text at note 163.

164. 115 S. Ct. 2610 (1995). Back to text at note 164.

165. Bans on anonymous publication are not unprecedented. England banned anonymous pamphlets between 1637 and 1694, when licensing laws required that all books bear the name of the author and printer. W.S. Holdsworth, Press Control and Copyright in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 29 Yale L.J. 841, 848-49 (1920).

As detailed in Anonymous Note, supra note 9, at 1084-93 (giving examples from English, French and U.S. practice), a number of state and federal statutes have sought to restrict anonymous speech or the freedom of anonymous association. The Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on anonymous speech and association on several occasions. In Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913), the Court upheld a requirement that mailers wishing second class mailing status publish a list of editors and proprietors twice annually, but relied on a "now-outdated view of the first amendment," Anonymous Note, supra note 9, at 1089. In Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943), the Supreme Court upheld a pre-WW I statute requiring foreign agents to register with the Secretary of States, but several subsequent decisions, culminating in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), suggested that the Supreme Court had turned away from the analysis in Viereck, see Anonymous Note, supra note 9, at 1093-1102.