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77. See supra note 43 (discussing the importance of identity in contemporary society). Back to text at note 77.

78. The anon.penet.fi help file is available online URL 0Z/Anonymous-Mail/Remailers/Instructions/Help-file -from- anon.penet.fi.gz. Back to text at note 78.

79. Douglas Lavin, Finnish Internet Fan Runs Service Allowing Anonymous Transmissions, Wall St. J., July 17, 1995, at A7 (reporting 8,000/day figure). Back to text at note 79.

80. See available online URL ~rnewman/scientology/home.html#PENET (describing incident). Differing descriptions of the Scientologists' legal efforts can be found at The Church of Scientology vs. the Net, available online URL ~rnewman/scientology/home.html (critical view); UK Scientology Critics, available online URL ~plmlp/scum.html (even more hostile); Church of Scientology International, available online URL goodman/csi.htm (Scientologists' view). Back to text at note 80.

81. Public-key systems allow users to append a digital signature to an unencrypted message. A digital signature uniquely identifies the sender and connects the sender to the message. Because the signature uses the plaintext as an input to the encryption algorithm, if the message is altered in even the slightest way, the signature will not decrypt properly, showing that the message was altered in transit or that the signature was forged by copying it from a different message. A properly implemented digital signature copied from one message has only an infinitesimal chance of successfully authenticating any other message. See Schneier, supra note 74, at 35. Back to text at note 81.

82. Comments of computer security consultant Hal Finney, available online URL 0Z/Anonymous-Mail/Issues/Background-Information.gz. Back to text at note 82.

83. So long as the private key in a key pair is not shared with anyone, a digital signature uniquely identifies the author of a document. For a short description of digital signatures, see Froomkin, supra note 6, at 895. Back to text at note 83.

84. "The citizen who is truly free in forming her identity should have the opportunity to experiment with roles she does not wish to adopt in public." Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 69 (1991) (citing Foucault and Goffman). For a suggestion that nyms be granted the legal right to own and borrow money, to transact, and to communicate, see Karnow, supra note 41, at 12-13. Back to text at note 84.

85. See supra note 66. Back to text at note 85.

86. See supra note 73 (discussing concept of "latency"). Back to text at note 86.

87. This risk is reduced by the provision of a "remailer pinging service" that regularly checks to see if remailers are forwarding their mail. See supra note 65. Back to text at note 87.

88. In addition, remailers do not defend against traditional methods of acquiring information. Encryption may foil a wiretap on the sender's telephone line, but the use of a remailer to send plaintext will not do so, since the message is captured at the source. Back to text at note 88.

89. See infra Part III. Back to text at note 89.

90. See supra text following note 75. Back to text at note 90.

91. To understand why this is so requires some background in how an ordinary e-mail message is transmitted from Alice's machine to Bob's via the Internet. Ordinarily the two computers do not communicate directly. Instead Alice's machine sends the message to a machine that it hopes is in Bob's general direction, and the message passes from machine to machine until it finds one that is in regular communication with Bob's. Each machine that handles the message appends "path" information to the e-mail that identifies it as having taken part in the communication. The final recipient receives the entire path data along with the text of the message, but most commercial e-mail packages are designed to avoid displaying this path information to the reader unless she asks for it.

Victor can instruct his computer to lie about its identity, and indeed can forge information suggesting that the message originated elsewhere far away, but he has no way to persuade the machine to which he sends the message to cooperate. As a result, it is possible for a sufficiently motivated Internet detective to identify the first machine to which Victor sent the message, especially if she has several messages to work with. See Spam FAQ or "Figuring out Fake E-Mail and Posts," available online URL ~gandalf/spamfaq.html. I f the machine that communicated with Victor keeps records of its e-mail handling, or if its operator can be persuaded to do start doing so, the Internet detective can identify Victor's machine, and perhaps even Victor, as the source of the remailed message. Back to text at note 91.

92. See supra note 80. Back to text at note 92.

93. The circuits conflict as to whether a defendant must agree to "personally commit" the predicate acts in a RICO conspiracy but none of the circuits have done away with the need for some sort of agreement between the parties to the conspiracy. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that the defendant's agreement to personally commit RICO predicate acts is not required. See United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1529 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Morris v. United States, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985); United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748, 760 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 924 (1990); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir), cert. denied, sub nom. Hawkins v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986), appeal after remand, 835 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 848 (1984). According to these circuits, the government need only prove that the defendant directly or indirectly conspired to conduct RICO activity. The First, Second, and Tenth Circuits require the government to prove that the defendant agreed to "personally commit" two or more predicate acts in a RICO conspiracy. See United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Rabito v. United States, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Killip, 819 F.2d 1542, 1548 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 987 (1987). Back to text at note 93.

94. Traffic analysis is the study of the sources and recipients of messages, including messages that the eavesdropper cannot understand. See Froomkin, supra note 6, at 747. Back to text at note 94.

95. See supra note 2. Back to text at note 95.

96. Pseudonymity differs from anonymity in a number of ways. Perhaps the most important difference is that pseudonymity allows for the creation and continuity of a "nym"--an alternate identity. See supra text accompanying note 82. In the case of the Federalist Papers, "Publius" was in fact three collaborators. On the Internet, "John" may be Jane, or little Johnny. Back to text at note 96.

97. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); for a forceful assertion of a moral right to associational or group privacy, see Edward J. Bloustein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle, 8 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 219 (1977). Back to text at note 97.

98. I discuss the U.S. hypersensitivity to conspiracy in Froomkin, supra note 6, at 850-62. Back to text at note 98.

99. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 486 U.S. 46 (1988).